Using a dangerous climate change framed public goods game, 1 examined whether persuasive messages that activate the "legacy motive"-the desire to build a positive legacy-can increase the willingness of current actors to make sacrifices for future generations. It was found that when the benefits of cooperation accrued to decision makers in the present, high levels of cooperation were sustained, whereas when the benefits accrued to future generations, intergenerational discounting caused cooperation to collapse. Crucially, when the legacy motive was activated-by promoting death awareness, feelings of power, and intergenerational reciprocity-intergenerational discounting was attenuated, and cooperation was restored. This supplementary document reports additional details about the experiment. It is not meant to be selfexplanatory-please consult 1 for further information.
Experimental Instructions

Short-delay condition
Welcome to the experiment! In this experiment, you can earn money. For a successful experiment, you must not communicate with other participants or make yourself noticeable to them in any way. Please read the following instructions carefully. Should you have any questions, please signal us. At the end of the instructions, you will find several control questions. Please answer all questions, and signal us when you have finished. We will then come to you and check your answers.
Climate change
Today you will take part in a game simulating climate change. Global climate change is a serious environmental problem faced by mankind. There is a consensus amongst the world's climate scientists that human emissions of greenhouse gases, especially carbon dioxide (CO 2 ), are causing climate change. CO 2 originates from the burning of fossil fuels like coal, oil, or natural gas in industrial processes and energy production, and from combustion engines of cars. It is a global pollutant, which means that each unit of CO 2 emitted has the same effect on the climate regardless of the location where the emission occurred. If global efforts are not made to reduce human CO 2 emissions, climate scientists have forecast that global average temperature will rise to dangerous levels, leading to a very different planet than the one that humanity currently knows.
About the experiment
At the start of the experiment, $85 will be credited to your account. This is comprised of a $40 operating fund and a $45 endowment. During the game you can use your operating fund freely; however the endowment will remain untouched.
In the course of the game you can decide how much of your $40 operating fund you invest. Any amount that you have not invested will be paid to you immediately after the game.
All decisions you make are anonymous. To ensure this, a pseudonym is assigned to you by the computer, visible at the bottom left of the screen. These pseudonyms correspond to names of moons in our solar system (Leda, Triton, Portia, Sinope, Carpo or Galatea).
In the course of this experiment you will play exactly 10 climate rounds.
In each of these rounds you can invest in an attempt to avoid dangerous climate change. One of the consequences of dangerous climate change will be serious economic loss. In this experiment, this is simulated through possible loss of your endowment if your group does not collectively invest at least $120 in the climate account by the end of round 10. What you do not use of your operating fund you will definitely be paid.
In each round of the game all six players will be asked: How much do you want to invest in climate protection? (possible answers: $0, $2 or $4).
When everyone has made a decision, all six player contributions will be displayed together on the screen. After the experiment, all contributions will be credited to an account for climate change.
Use of the money in the climate account
Funded by the money you pay into the climate account, we will place an advertisement in a large daily newspaper. This will give general information about simple methods for climate protection-methods that everybody can implement without much effort to protect our climate and to assist in avoiding dangerous climate change. The more money we collect the larger and more conspicuous the advertisement will be. If this promotion is successful, sponsors for international advertising campaigns could be mobilized.
Continue climate round
After every round, each player's contribution will be displayed to all players.
Example: On round 3, four players have decided to invest into climate protection. Two of them paid $2, while another two paid $4. "Group Total Round 3" shows the amount invested in the climate account for the current round. In total, $12 was invested in climate protection and thus credited to the climate account.
"Climate Account Total" shows the current balance of the climate account-the sum of the investments to the climate account across all rounds so far.
Player strategies
You can choose to play using many different strategies.
For example, you and your 5 co-players could contribute $120 or more during the 10 rounds (on average at least $20 each). In the event that your group reaches this target you would safely receive your endowment of $45 in cash in this room tomorrow between 9am and 5pm. Money remaining in your operating fund would be paid to you in cash immediately after the game. Using this strategy you would earn a total of $65: about $20 directly after the game, and $45 tomorrow.
Another strategy could be to contribute nothing from your operating fund over the 10 rounds. In this case you would obtain the entire $40 of your operating fund in cash immediately after the game. If your group has not invested at least $120 after 10 rounds, you will lose your endowment with a probability of 90%. However, there remains a 10% chance that you will receive your endowment tomorrow. You will be informed of this outcome at the end of the game. Using this strategy you would earn a total of $40, paid today directly after the game.
Of course there are many other strategies you could use, aside from these two examples.
Remember, if your group reaches the $120 target, your endowment will be paid to you tomorrow in this room between 9am and 5pm, instead of directly after the game today.
End of the game
At the end of the game (after exactly 10 climate rounds) the computer will compare the climate account with the threshold amount of $120. The threshold amount must be reached to avoid dangerous climate change. It is reached if every player pays on average $2 per round for climate protection. In this case, $12 per round would be paid into the climate account.
If the $120 target has been reached in the climate account, every player will receive the $45 endowment in cash the next day. Any money that has not been invested and remains in your operating fund will be paid to you anonymously in cash, immediately after the game.
If the threshold amount for the climate account is not reached, dangerous climate change will occur with a probability of 90% (9 out of 10 cases), followed by serious economic losses. This is the probability of losing your $45 endowment. Irrespective of this, any remaining money not invested from your operating fund will be paid to you anonymously in cash.
There is a probability of 10% (1 out of 10 cases) that you would keep your endowment of $45. After the game the computer decides randomly by "throwing a dice" with this probability. Any remaining money not invested from your operating fund will be paid to you anonymously in cash, immediately after the game.
Operating fund -$40:
During the game, you can choose to contribute from this into a climate account. What you do not invest, you will definitely be paid anonymously and in cash at the end of the game, irrespective of whether your group paid the minimum $120 into the climate account.
Endowment -$45:
You will be paid this amount tomorrow, anonymously and in cash, if your group has paid at least $120 into the climate account.
If your group has not paid $120, you will lose your endowment with a probability of 90% (in 9 out of 10 cases).
Summary
Total capital = operating fund + endowment 10 rounds will be played
In each round you can invest $0, $2 or $4 in climate protection.
If you have finished reading the instructions and do not have any questions, please answer the control questions on the sheet in front of you.
Intergenerational condition
Climate change
About the experiment
Use of the money in the climate account
Continue climate round
After every round, each player's contribution will be displayed to all players. "Group Total Round 3" shows the amount invested in the climate account for the current round. In total, $12 was invested in climate protection and thus credited to the climate account.
Player strategies
For example, you and your 5 co-players could contribute $120 or more during the 10 rounds (on average at least $20 each). In the event that your group reaches this target, we will invest each player's $45 endowment in planting trees for the next generation, in the framework of a reforestation project. Trees are the cornerstone of healthy societies, and play an important role in addressing climate change. They do this by helping to reduce atmospheric carbon dioxide levels. The trees will not be used for commercial purposes and will store carbon dioxide for at least 80 years. By capturing and storing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, the trees will benefit the next generation by helping to mitigate against climate change. Money remaining in your operating fund would be paid to you in cash immediately after the game.
Using the above strategy, you would earn a total of $20 in cash directly after the game, and a $45 endowment to the next generation would be invested into reforestation of trees. This would amount to a combined reforestation investment of $270 (6 players × $45 each), which would plant 72 trees (12 trees per player). Evidence for the deposit of this investment would be displayed on our website (http://bel-uwa.github.io).
Another strategy could be to contribute nothing from your operating fund over the 10 rounds. In this case you would obtain the entire $40 of your operating fund in cash immediately after the game. If your group has not invested at least $120 after 10 rounds you will lose the endowment of the next generation with a probability of 90% (9 out of 10 cases). However, there remains a 10% chance (1 out of 10 cases) that trees will be planted regardless. You will be informed of this outcome at the end of the game. Using this strategy you would earn a total of $40, paid today after the game.
End of the game
At the end of the game (after exactly 10 rounds) the computer will compare the climate account with the threshold amount of $120. The threshold amount must be reached to avoid dangerous climate change. It is reached if every player pays on average $2 per round for climate protection. In this case, $12 per round would be paid into the climate account.
If the $120 target has been reached in the climate account, each player's $45 endowment ($270 in total) will be invested in the reforestation of trees for the next generation. Any money that has not been invested and remains in your operating fund will be paid to you anonymously in cash, immediately after the game.
If the threshold amount for the climate account is not reached, dangerous climate change will occur with a probability of 90% (9 out of 10 cases), followed by serious economic losses. This is the probability of losing the $45 endowment for the next generation. Irrespective of this, any remaining money not invested from your operating fund will be paid to you anonymously in cash.
There is a probability of 10% (1 out of 10 cases) that trees will be planted for the next generation, even if the target is not reached. After the game the computer decides randomly by "throwing a dice" with this probability. Any remaining money not invested from your operating fund will be paid to you anonymously in cash, immediately after the game.
Operating fund -$40:
Endowment of the next generation -$45:
This amount will be invested for each player in planting trees for the next generation, if your group has paid at least $120 into the climate account.
If the group has not paid $120, the endowment of the next generation will be lost with a probability of 90% (9 out of 10 cases).
Summary
Legacy induction condition
Climate change
About the experiment
Use of the money in the climate account
Continue climate round
Verbal Passages
At the beginning of rounds 1, 4, and 7 you will be required to read a short verbal passage about protecting the climate before you decide how much you want to invest in the climate account. Please read the passages very carefully as you will be questioned about their contents in the questionnaire at the end of the experiment.
Player strategies
End of the game
Operating fund -$40:
Endowment of the next generation -$45:
Summary
Control Questions
For a successful experiment, it is imperative that each player understands the rules of play. Please answer the following questions so that we can ensure that you have understood the instructions. Please answer all questions, and signal us when you have finished. We will then come to you and check your answers. 3 Legacy Enacting Messages
Mortality salience
Leaving A Positive Legacy
Whether in months, years or decades, we all face the same fate as human beings. Death is certain, and life is short, even though family, friendships, and career all feel as though they will last forever. Before we know it, we will reach a point of reflection rather than action. We will be in the position of passing the places and objects in our lives on to new generations.
We all leave footprints on the world. Some are fleeting, like a smile to lift someone's day, and some are more enduring. Even though we cannot live forever, our actions will live on long after we do. These actions can be a benefit or burden to future generations, and they dictate how our time on this planet will be remembered.
Our footprints on the world remain long after we are gone.
As the current stewards of the Earth, we have a responsibility to behave in ways that do not create burdens for future generations. Behaving without regard to the life and environment of future generations is unethical in a civilized society. If we fail to take action on climate change, it will have disastrous consequences for our grandchildren and great-grandchildren. However, by engaging in behaviours that protect the climate, we can help to shield our descendants from harm. By doing what is morally right, we can ensure that we are remembered positively by future generations.
Power asymmetry
The Helpless Nature of Future Generations
It is easy to think our decisions shaped what our world looks like today. However, the world as we know it is largely a reflection of the past. Previous generations of people made the decisions that moulded our communities, laws, culture, environment, and economy into what they are today. Almost every aspect of our society is the result of other generation's decisions, whether 50 or 200 years ago, and what they decided on, we have inherited, for better or worse.
We are completely powerless in receiving what past generations left to us. They had no obligation to care about us, but they did so nevertheless. Now, we are in that same position of absolute power: what we decide now will dictate what future generations will receive from us. Everything that we do now will affect them, but nothing they can do will affect us.
We have a responsibility to help powerless future generations.
Climate change might not seem like a present danger. However, its effects will worsen with time, meaning that future generations will experience catastrophic consequences if we do not tackle this burden for them now. Whether or not we decide to act, future generations are voiceless in the matter. They cannot negotiate their needs and rights to land and life. They are completely helpless and at our mercy. Accordingly, we have a responsibility to speak and act on their behalf.
Intergenerational reciprocity
We Are One With Future Generations
Humans have always faced great trials and adversity. Our parents and grandparents have faced many challenges, which have tested their personal strength and courage. Each generation has been burdened with problems in some shape or form, from the small to the seemingly insurmountable. And for each problem overcome by one generation, another arises to confront the next.
More than 70 years ago, the greatest problem of members of that generation's time was achieving world peace by winning World War II. Millions of war veterans from many countries fought and died for the Allied forces to protect our lands, rights, and freedoms, so that we could inherit a peaceful and just world. In the darkness of war they were confronted with unimaginable horrors and seemingly impossible challenges, but their strength and bravery shone through. They achieved their goal of peace and freedom, and today we honour and remember them for giving us the world we inherited.
We are one link in a chain connecting us with past and future generations.
Climate change is the greatest problem of our time. If we fail to act, there will be disastrous consequences for future generations, placing our grandchildren and great-grandchildren at risk of great personal hardship. But like our ancestors before us, this problem is an opportunity for us to demonstrate our own willingness to shape a better world for future others. It is our chance to ensure that our descendants remember us as a generation that did not shirk their responsibility to protect them from harm. Just as past generations have taken actions to benefit us, so too must we for generations to come. 
Supplementary Analyses
After the experiment, participants completed a brief questionnaire (section 6) to identify attitudes, beliefs, economic preferences, personality traits and states, and ideological factors that might have influenced their investments during the climate cooperation game.
Attitudes and beliefs about climate change were assessed using two items (climate belief items). First, players were asked to indicate which of four statements best represented their attitude toward climate change: 'I don't think climate change is happening' (deny); 'I have no idea whether climate change is happening or not' (don't know); 'I think that climate change is happening, but it's just a natural fluctuation in Earth's temperatures' (natural); 'I think that climate change is happening, and I think that humans are largely causing it' (human). We expected that investments would be lowest from players in the 'deny' category followed by players in the 'don't know' and 'natural' categories, with investments being highest from players in the 'human' category. Second, participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they believe humans are responsible for climate change on a scale ranging from 0% (not at all caused by human activity) to 100% (entirely caused by human activity). We expected that individual player investments would be positively correlated with responses on this belief item. Considering first responses on the attitudinal item, of the 180 participants two indicated that they 'don't know' whether climate change is happening or not; 23 indicated that they thought climate change was due to 'natural' temperature variability; and 155 indicated that they thought climate change is due to 'human' activity ( Fig. S1a) . Investments amongst the 'natural' group ($9.48 ± 1.47) were on average 137% higher than investments in the 'don't know' group ($4 ± 2), and investments amongst the 'human' group ($17.85 ± .67) were, in turn, 88% higher on average than investments in the 'natural' group. A one-way ANOVA confirmed that individual investments in the climate account varied significantly across climate change attitude groups, F(2,177) = 12.78, p < .001. Simple contrasts revealed that the difference between the 'don't know' and 'natural' groups was not significant, t(177) = .91, p = .367-no doubt due to the small number of observations in the former group-whereas the difference between the 'natural' and 'human' groups was significant, t(177) = 2.37, p = .019.
Turning to the climate change belief item, overall there was a moderate significant positive correlation between individual participant responses on this item and their personal investment in the climate account, r = .35, p < .001 ( Fig. S1b ). However, when examined by condition, the correlation remained significant only in the intergenerational, r = .27, p = .039, and legacy induction conditions, r = .40, p = .001-small and moderate correlations, respectively. By contrast, the correlation in the control condition was not significant, r = .18, p = .175.
Climate change beliefs were higher in the short-delay (78.33 ± 2.56) and legacy induction (75.80 ± 2.56) conditions, than in the intergenerational condition (67.20 ± 2.56). We therefore conducted an Analysis of Covariance-with condition as a fixed factor and climate change belief as a covariate-on total player investments to ensure that the reliable differences between conditions reported in XXXXXXXXX et al. 1 still stood after controlling for the influence of climate change beliefs. As expected, there was a reliable effect of climate change belief, F(1,176) = 16.56, p < .001, but the effect of condition was still reliable after controlling for the effect of this variable, F(2,176) = 6.37, p = .002. Simple contrasts statistically confirmed that player investments in the climate account were reliably higher in the short-delay condition, compared to the intergenerational condition, t(176) = 3.49, p < .001, and in the legacy induction condition, compared to the intergenerational condition, t(176) = 2.44, p < .016.
Risk preferences were elicited using a choice over gambles (risk preference item) that permitted classification of individuals as either risk averse, risk neutral, or risk seeking. Fig. S2 visualises the effect of risk preferences on investment behaviour from which it can be seen that total player investments in the climate account were highest for risk averse players ($17.67 ± 0.74), followed by risk neutral players ($14.62 ± 1.68), with risk seeking players Figure S3 | Affinity with future generations as a function of condition. Although affinity with future generations is higher in the legacy induction condition than the short-delay condition, so too is it higher in the intergenerational condition, and by a comparable degree.
investing the least ($11.89 ± 1.97). Accordingly, total investments increased as a function of degree of risk aversion, as one would expect. A one-way ANOVA on these data revealed a reliable effect of risk preferences, F(2,177) = 4.63, p = .011. Simple contrasts confirmed that investments in the climate account were reliably higher amongst risk averse than risk seeking players, t(177) = -2.75, p = .007, but investments in the climate account did not differ reliably between risk averse and risk neutral players, t(177) = -1.67, p = .097.
Affinity with future generations-a psychological state reflecting the degree to which individuals feel a connection with future generations-was measured using four-items (affinity items, α = 0.88). 7 Time perspective-a related psychological trait that refers to a disposition toward present or future thinking-was assessed using fourteen-items (time perspective items, α = .88). We had expected that affinity with future generations would be higher in the legacy induction condition than in the short-delay and intergenerational conditions, although only tentatively so. This is because of the three mechanisms used to induce the legacy motive-namely intergenerational reciprocity, power asymmetry, and mortality salience-only the first is assumed to act by promoting affinity with future generations. 8 We also anticipated that affinity with future generations would be positively correlated with time perspective, and that both variables would be positively correlated with individual investments in the climate account.
Considering the first of these predictions, affinity with future generations was higher in the legacy induction condition (5.23 ± 0.17) than in the short-delay condition (4.44 ± 0.17), but so too was it higher in the intergenerational condition (5.10 ± 0.17), and by a similar degree (Fig. S3) . A one-way ANOVA on affinity scores by condition was reliable, F(2,177) = 6.09, p = .003. Simple contrasts confirmed that although affinity scores were higher in the legacy induction condition than in the short-delay condition, t(177) = -2.70, p = .008, affinity scores did not differ reliably between the legacy induction and intergenerational conditions, t(177) = .56, p = .574. Turning to the second and third predictions, affinity with future generations was indeed moderately positively correlated with time perspective, r = .43, p < .001, and both affinity with future generations and time perspective were positively correlated with personal investments in the climate account (r = .26, p < .001, and, r = .23, p = .002, respectively).
Finally, we examined the relationship between investments in the climate account and two ideological variables, namely social dominance orientation-which was measured with four-items (social dominance items, α = .70)-and political ideology on the liberal to conservative continuum-which was measured with a single-item (political ideology item). Social dominance orientation (SDO) is a personality trait that reflects an individuals degree of approval of group-based hierarchies. It is associated with discriminatory and prejudicial beliefs about various minority groups, and conservative political worldviews. 3 Individuals who are high in SDO desire to maintain inequality between social groups, as well as individual group members. Accordingly, we anticipated that SDO would be negatively correlated with personal investments in the climate account, since individuals who have high levels of this construct are likely to perceive that their group members are inferior to themselves, and should therefore shoulder any burden of responsibility for contributing to the public good. We also anticipated that SDO would be positively correlated with political conservatism, and that political conservatism, in turn, would be negatively correlated with investments in the climate account, given the well-established negative association between conservative worldviews and belief in anthropogenic climate change. 4 The first prediction was not corroborated-that is, SDO was not reliably correlated with investments in the climate game, r = .04, p = .608, whereas the second prediction was corroborated-as expected, SDO was reliably positively correlated with political conservatism, r = .21, p = .005. So too was the third prediction corroborated-political conservatism was reliably negatively correlated with personal investments in the climate account, r = -.18, p = .015. 2. How much do you think human activity contributes to climate change, as a percentage of overall climate change? Please enter a value from 0 (not at all caused by humans) to 100 (entirely caused by humans).
Risk preference 6
Please imagine the following situation: You have $40. With a probability of 50%, you will lose all $40. You can avoid the risk by giving away $20 of the $40. Would you pay the $20 to avoid the risk?
Indifferent Yes No
Affinity with future generations 7
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each item using the 7-point scale (1 = Not At All and 7 = Very Much So).
9. I generally ignore warnings about possible future problems because I think the problems will be resolved before they reach crisis level. 10 . I think that sacrificing now is usually unnecessary since future outcomes can be dealt with at a later time. 11. I only act to satisfy immediate concerns, figuring that I will take care of future problems that may occur at a later date. 12. Since my day-to-day work has specific outcomes, it is more important to me than behaviour that has distant outcomes. 13. When I make a decision, I think about how it might affect me in the future. 14. My behaviour is generally influenced by future consequences.
Social dominance orientation scale 10
There are many kinds of groups in the world: men and women, ethnic and religious groups, nationalities, political factions. How much do you support or oppose the ideas about groups in general? Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each item using the 10-point scale (1 = Extremely Oppose and 10 = Extremely Favour).
Tree Planting Pledge
Tree planting pledge given to participants in the intergenerational and legacy induction conditions.
